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Abstract 
 
The goal of this study is to measure the cyber 
security awareness of medical professionals in 
Poland, i.e. to verify whether healthcare specialists 
have knowledge and understanding of basic cyber 
security threats. This survey was based on the cyber 
security recommendations from the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security and the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The 
survey consisted of 23 single and multiple-choice 
questions divided into four parts. The results 
categorized the respondents and measured the level 
of cyber security awareness. Among the 620 persons 
invited to participate in the survey, 300 (48.39%) 
responded and answered all of the questions. The 
results show a an unsatisfactory level of knowledge 
regarding information security in Poland. The main 
conclusion drawn from the survey is that the quality 
of cyber security training among medical 
professionals should be improved and frequency of 
the trainings should be increased. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Electronic medical documentation is becoming 
increasingly popular. It has many advantages 
compared to paper-based documentation. Several 
information systems are used during the healthcare 
process, starting from a system for managing patient 
documentation (e.g. electronic health records 
(EHRs)) and organisational issues (e.g. patient 
admission) at healthcare sites, and ending at financial 
systems. All security systems depend on security 
measures. In addition, the proper management of a 
system, e.g. applying security updates, system 
configurations, and user training, has a heavy impact 
on system security. The users play a vital role in the 
security of eHealth systems. Improper user 
behaviours such as writing passwords on sticky 
notes, using the same USB drives in many different 
computers (e.g. at the hospital and at home), and 
downloading unsecured attachments from emails, 
create entry points for hackers who want to penetrate 
an eHealth system.  
Cyberattacks on eHealth systems can have many 
different consequences impacting the basic security 
properties of medical records, i.e. availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity [1, 2]. For example, 
when patient data become unavailable (e.g. from 
numerous ransomware attacks on hospitals that delete 
or encrypt their medical data), the hospital can no 
longer provide healthcare services. In addition, 
patient-sensitive data might be disclosed, which has 
many negative consequences for patients and is a 
serious legal problem for healthcare sites. Finally, an 
undetected and unauthorised modification of medical 
records might lead to an incorrect treatment. 
 
1.1. Motivation and contribution 
 
The goal of this study was to verify whether 
healthcare specialists (e.g. physicians, nurses, and 
laboratory assistants) in Poland have sufficient 
knowledge regarding basic cybersecurity threats, 
particularly whether they are trained to fulfil all 
security requirements required by the General Data 
Protection Regulations (GDPR) [3], 
recommendations of the Health Care Information 
Systems Center [4], and Polish acts regulating patient 
rights and hospital operations. As the main 
contribution, results from a survey can be used to 
improve the application of cyber security training in 
Poland. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. e-Health systems 
 
Electronic health record (EHR) systems are being 
developed in many different countries around the 
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world. The basic concept of EHR is that it is a virtual 
container for health-related documentations of a 
subject undergoing care (for a precise definition, see 
ISO 13606 [5]). Nation-wide EHR systems provide a 
single point of access to patient medical data. Apart 
from an EHR, several eHealth systems are usually 
deployed to facilitate the healthcare process, e.g. for 
telemedicine, drug detection, adverse interactions, 
decision-support systems, prescriptions, or sick leave 
certificate management. 
The adoption rates of EHR systems vary around 
the world. In 2015, Chang and Rupta [6] reviewed 
the EHR adoption rate in Canada. They found that, 
depending on the region, between 40% and 75% of 
physicians are using an EHR system. In the European 
Union, some countries have a very high EHR 
adoption. However, we still see EU countries with a 
low EHR implementation. The problems with EHR 
adoption were fully discussed in [7]. The concerns of 
potential patients regarding the privacy and security 
of medical records in the United States were studied 
by Patel et al. [8], who found that most adults are 
confident in the privacy and security of their medical 
records. However, many have declared concerns 
regarding information sharing between different 
providers. A minority of consumers withhold 
information from their providers owing to privacy 
and security concerns. 
In Poland, electronic medical documentation is 
commonly used in hospitals; however, such systems 
are usually local and are not interconnected. In 2018, 
the pilot implementation of nation-wide e-
prescription systems commenced testing, which will 
continue until 2020 with the aim of transitioning to 
only e-prescriptions. It is worth mentioning that 
many physicians electronically issue prescriptions, 
which are stored in a local system, and the patients 
receive a printed version. Poland’s EHR system, 
called the Electronic Platform for Collection, 
Analysis, and Provision of Digital Resources on 
Medical Events, should be operational in 2020. 
 
2.2. Healthcare data security 
 
In 2019, Jalali et al. [9] published the bibliometric 
analysis of the literature concerning cyber security in 
healthcare for the last 20 years. They analysed 472 
English-language journal articles. More than half of 
the papers were related to the technological and 
management issues. The analysis’ result shows that 
human and organizational aspects as well as physical 
security in healthcare might be understudied. 
Medical data have a sensitive nature and should 
be protected using appropriate security measures. 
Many studies regarding security and privacy aspects 
in the field of eHealth have been published [10-12]. 
However, owing to the complex nature of eHealth 
systems, it is difficult to achieve a desirable security 
level in practice.  
The most cited papers about technological aspects 
of cyber security concern security and privacy issues 
connected with: wireless body area networks [13], 
the framework for m-Health security [14], and the 
security architecture designed for providing 
authentication and authorization services in web-
based distributed systems [15]. Moreover, aspects 
such as security of IoT devices [16] or new 
cryptographic schemes, e.g. [17], designed for 
healthcare systems are a common subject. 
Cyber security in hospitals was studied from an 
organisational perspective by Jalali et al. [18] in 
2018. One of their main findings is that reducing the 
end point complexity increases the security, mainly 
because the complex IT environment in a hospital is 
vulnerable for exploitation by cybercriminals. Their 
analysis shows that efforts to homogenise resource 
availability across hospitals reduce the probability of 
a cyberattack. In Europe, Landolt et al. [19] evaluated 
the current status of information security in Swiss 
hospitals. The results showed very low scores, 
particularly for basic security issues. Cyber security 
problems in healthcare in the US were summarised in 
2017 by Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task 
Force [20]. 
Luna et al. [21] analysed 19 articles and Kruse et 
al. [22] 31 articles concerning cyber threats in 
healthcare. The results of that studies show that 
healthcare industry lags behind in security and that 
current security systems in healthcare are insufficient 
in relation to capabilities of cyber criminals.  
The European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) published a study [23] 
in which they recognised security expertise and 
awareness as two of the most important cyber 
security challenges in eHealth. This is an important 
issue because minimising human errors, which can be 
a cause of successful cyberattacks, is crucial [24, 25]. 
The human factor in certain countries, e.g. Austria, is 
considered the most important cause of security 
failures [23]. 
The user plays an important role in cyber security. 
Because the training of an IT staff alone is 
insufficient, many cyber security threats are caused 
by human error or a lack of awareness [26]. Even in 
well-secured eHealth systems, user credentials can be 
compromised using social engineering techniques. 
Risk awareness is an important factor in a user’s 
decision-making process when faced with cyber 
threats. User compliance regarding cyber security 
rules depends on the knowledge and understanding of 
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the rules [27]. Bellekens at el. [28] verified through a 
survey the user risk awareness with regard to 
connected eHealth wearables. The results indicate a 
low understanding of the threats related to connected 
wearables, and that a vast majority of users 
underestimate the risk encountered when using such 
devices. In addition, the participants were unaware of 
the consequences of certain threats. 
 
2.3. Social engineering attacks 
 
In recent years, hospitals have been the targets of 
many different types of cyber security attacks. One of 
the most common attacks is a ransomware attack, in 
which hackers try to encrypt a hospital database and 
obtain a ransom in exchange for a decryption key 
[29]. Sittig and Singh [30] proposed an eight-
dimensional socio-technical approach for preventing 
or mitigating ransomware attacks. With this 
approach, they recommend health organisations to 
train users on ransomware prevention strategies, 
including how to identify malicious emails and avoid 
clicking on potentially weaponised attachments, and 
to train users not to use USB flash drives from 
untrusted sources. A similar recommendation comes 
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services [31], as summarised by Pope [32]. In 
addition to the above recommendations, it has been 
emphasised that users should never install or 
download software on their computers unless it 
comes from a verified source, and should understand 
what types of electronic information they are 
permitted to access. 
Apart from ransomware threats, if a hacker 
obtains unauthorised access to patient medical data 
owing to an omission by a healthcare professional, 
the professional may suffer legal consequences. In 
addition, if a healthcare professional incorrectly 
verifies the authenticity of a false file with medical 
data created by an impostor, it may have a seriously 
negative effect on a patient’s treatment, resulting in 
serious legal consequences for the healthcare 
professional. 
 
3. Methods  
 
The survey was created to test cyber security 
awareness in Poland. The survey, set up as a cross-
sectional study, was conducted in the second half of 
2017. This survey was based on the cyber security 
recommendations from the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security [23] and the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [24]. 
Questions were chosen in such a way that they tested 
issues raised in these recommendations. As an 
additional requirement, the respondents must be able 
to answer all questions in less than 10 min, making it 
easier to obtain more responses from overworked 
medical professionals. The assumed time limit 
reduced the number of questions applied. 
The survey consisted of 23 single and multiple-
choice questions divided into four parts: the 
respondent’s particulars (Information Part), electronic 
systems usage at a healthcare site (Part I), cyber 
security knowledge and skills (Part II), and basic 
cyberattack scenarios (Part III). The survey was 
anonymous and an electronic version was mainly 
used. The survey was sent to the contact addresses of 
healthcare sites along with a cover letter from the 
department at our university, which described the 
purpose of the survey. We received individual 
responses. A few hospitals contacted us to verify the 
origin of the survey as they thought it might be a part 
of cyberattack, which was a reaction that we 
expected. 
The research was aimed at measuring the level of 
cyber security awareness of healthcare professionals 
in Polish hospitals. The results were collected to 
conduct a statistical analysis of the gathered data. A 
result was used, where the answers to unambiguous 
questions were rated on a point scale of zero or 1 
(answer correct). For the multiple-choice questions, 
each correct answer was given 1 point. The result 
categorised the respondents and measured the level of 
cyber security awareness among the surveyed 
personnel. In addition, the SPSS program was used to 
analyse the collected factors. The program showed 
which independent results should be obtained for 
each question, as well as the results within the groups 
of respondents. Normalisation eliminated all 
components with a value of below 1.0, where a 
significance of p<.05 was assumed. No additional 
criteria for determining the optimal number of factors 
were examined because doing so was not the purpose 
of this particular study. Each respondent’s influence 
on the level of cyber security awareness in their 
hospital was determined using the F-Snedecora test, 
and p- and t-tests. The differences among the 
questions examined were calculated based on the R2 
determination coefficient and the standard deviation 
(SD). The survey took into account the results, which 
allowed the resulting classifications of the examined 
groups (e.g. doctors, physiotherapists, and nurses) to 
be shown in terms of percentage. In addition, the 
confidence interval was measured for the groups of 
surveyed respondents, in which the average number 
of points from the questionnaire was obtained. The 
findings made it possible to analyse the main 
objective defined (proposed) in this document. 
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4. Results  
 
Of the 620 people invited to participate in the 
survey, 300 (48.4%) responded and answered all of 
the questions. The remaining respondents, namely 
320 (51.6%), resigned during the completion of the 
questionnaire. We suspect that that the relatively high 
resignation ratio comes from the fact that many of the 
respondents only opened the survey, looked at it, and 
decided to not fill it out. The questionnaire was also 
considered finished when the participants declared 
that they do not use electronic documentation in the 
workplace. The categories ‘Invite’, ‘Dismissed’, and 
‘Completed’ in Table 1 indicate whether a page of the 
survey was visited. Questions from the initial 
information section were fully filled in, and for the 
last question, ‘Do you use electronic health-related 
documentation in your work?’ a negative answer 
ended the survey. According to this research 
approach, a group of 300 (48.39%) respondents was 
achieved. Only the 300 completed datasets were used 
for further analysis. 
 
Table 1. Analysis of returned 
questionnaires 
Characteristic n (%) 
Invite 
Doctors 420 (67.7) 
Nurses and midwives 20 (3.2) 
Physiotherapists 80 (12.9) 
Laboratory assistants 20 (3.2) 
Medical administrators 80 (12.9) 
Dismissed 
Doctors 220 (68.8) 
Nurses and midwives 5 (1.6) 
Physiotherapists 29 (9.1) 
Laboratory assistants 10 (3.1) 
Medical administrators 56 (17.5) 
Completed 
Doctors 200 (66.7) 
Nurses and midwives 15 (5) 
Physiotherapists 51 (17) 
Laboratory assistants 10 (3.3) 
Medical administrators 24 (8) 
 
Out of the 620 respondents who completed the 
questionnaire, approximately 36,1% have worked for 
less than 5 years in the health care industry. The 
study investigated knowledge about cybersecurity of 
the whole medical group without division into 
professions. 
 
Table 2. Ratio of correct answers in relation 
to the corresponding knowledge 
 
PART 1 
Electronic 
system usage 
at a healthcare 
site 
PART 2 
Cyber 
security 
knowledge 
and skills 
PART 3 
Basic 
cyberattack 
scenarios 
Doctors 45.2% 50% 37.5% 
Nurses and 
midwives 45.3% 45.3% 33.3% 
Physiotherapists 35.5% 48.2% 31.1% 
Medical 
laboratory 
workers  43% 39% 44% 
Medical 
administrators 42.5% 36.3% 34.5% 
 
To determine the general knowledge regarding 
cyber security awareness in the hospitals in Poland, 
each answer within the group of respondents was 
calculated as independently to question in the survey. 
The percentages shown in Table 3 indicate the 
number of respondents with knowledge regarding 
cyber security in the medical field. Each correct 
response within the group of respondents was divided 
into three parts: electronic systems use at the 
healthcare site (Part I), cyber security knowledge and 
skills (Part II), and basic cyberattack scenarios (Part 
III). Based on the 300 (48.4%) respondents working 
in hospitals in Poland who completed the 
questionnaire, a factor analysis of the 23 questions 
contained in the questionnaire was conducted, as 
presented in the tables, and five questions were 
excluded (the first questions were concerning the 
information of the respondents themselves, and not 
their knowledge regarding cyber security).  
The respondents who completed the questionnaire 
achieved total scores ranging from 33% to 50% out 
of a maximum score of 100%. These results for the 
three parts of the questionnaire are shown in Table 2, 
in which each individual result of the professional 
group (doctors, nurses and midwives, 
physiotherapists, medical laboratory workers, and 
medical administrators) was calculated as a 
percentage of the number of correct answers to the 
questions in the survey. These percentages are 
presented in Figure 1 as correct answers to questions 
from the questionnaire. In addition, the results in 
Figure 1 show the ratio of knowledge of the 
individual groups in relation to the individual parts 
contained in the survey. 
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Figure 1. Evaluation of correct answers of 
healthcare professionals to questions on the 
survey 
 
In the present study, the results of the correct 
answers were measured from the respondents based 
on the confidence intervals. This study included the 
maximum number of points from the completed 
questionnaire, which was 20 points. In the survey, the 
respondents answered 23 questions, five of which 
were excluded (the first questions concerned 
information on the respondents themselves, and not 
their knowledge regarding cyber security). The 
confidence interval included a correct answer rate of 
95%, namely, the probability that the result of a 
correct answer outside this area would be less than 
p< 0.05. A 95% confidence interval for the standard 
normal distribution is thus the interval (11.74, 15.09) 
because 95% of the answers where applied. The 
confidence interval included 95% of the correct 
answers of the respondents. It should be noted that 
the maximum score from one questionnaire was 20 
points out of 18 questions, pointing out that the two 
questions were multiple choice. 
One of the most important data obtained from the 
survey is presented in Table 2. It needs to be 
underlined that Table 3 shows the ratio of all 
responses, each of the surveyed groups of 
respondents, and their correct answers to the 
questions. The average score shown in the table 
indicates the group of doctors who filled in 44.2% of 
the correct answers to the questionnaires. The worst 
answered the questions to medical administrators 
who responded to 37.8% of questions correctly. The 
results in Table 3 show the percentage of correct 
answers that can be classified into knowledge 
regarding the respondents’ answers. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results of correct answers of respondents to questions measured in terms of 
percentage 
 
  
Doctors 
Nurses and 
midwives 
Physiothe
rapists 
Medical 
laboratory 
workers 
Medical 
administrators 
PART 1 
Electronic system usage at a healthcare site: 
1 Did you have cyber security training at work?  75% 66.7% 58.8% 80% 83.3% 
3  Do you think that the electronic circulation of 
documents at your healthcare site is adequately 
protected? 
55% 66.7% 17.7% 50% 25% 
4 
Do you use a mobile device (smartphone or tablet) 
to read electronic medical records? 
55% 33.3% 21.6% 80% 0% 
5 Can you copy medical records to a non-secured 
portable storage? 
55% 66.7% 21.6% 100% 79.2% 
6 The program for creating and processing electronic 
medical records does not allow granting physicians 
the rights to: 
34.5% 20% 11.8% 0% 8.3% 
7 
When making an incorrect entry in the electronic 
medical records system, the entry…: (3 correct 
answers) 
35% 66.7% 19.6% 0% 41.7% 
52,5% 33.3% 47.1 0% 25% 
5% 0% 1.9% 50% 16,7% 
8 Does the electronic medical record system allow 
you to: (multiple choice, 2 correct answers) 70% 66.7% 100% 100% 100% 
70% 66.7% 68.6% 50% 41.7% 
PART 2  
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Cyber security knowledge and skills: 
1 Do you know the legal consequences related to the 
public disclosure of a patient’s medical data? 
95% 100% 90.2% 50% 100% 
2 Can you securely send a patient’s medical records 
by email? 
50% 46.7% 39.2% 30% 41.7% 
3 Are you aware of the existence of simple online 
tools that allow you to impersonate any email 
address? 
50% 46.7% 25.5% 0% 0% 
4 Can you electronically sign documents? 40% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
5 Do you issue medical certificates in the form of 
digitally signed documents?  
30% 66.7% 39.2% 50% 20.8% 
6 What conditions must exist to consider e-
documents secure? 
65% 66.7% 78.4% 80% 50% 
7 Does a pdf file containing the scan of a printed and 
signed document have more legal value than a pdf 
document without an electronic signature (in 
Poland)? 
12.5% 0% 29.4% 0% 0% 
8 Is the software on your computer continuously 
updated? (2 correct answers) 
  
90% 26.7% 49% 80% 95.8% 
 2.5% 33.3% 13.7% 20% 4.2% 
PART 3  
Basic cyberattack scenarios: 
1 
If you find a pen drive in a cafe, will you connect it 
to your computer at work? …: (2 correct answers) 
75% 33.3% 29.4% 60% 16.7% 
20% 33.3% 29.4% 0% 83.3% 
2 
You received an email in your work inbox with 
information from the system administrator asking 
you to click on a link, log in, and confirm your 
password to conduct administrative tasks in the 
system. What will you do? …: (3 correct answers) 
20% 0% 29.41% 0% 20.8% 
15% 33.3% 29.4% 50% 20.8% 
40% 33.3% 0% 50% 41.7% 
3 
You received medical documentation (in the form of 
a.pdf file) as an email attachment regarding a 
patient from another specialist. Can you trust that 
the documentation received is authentic? How can 
you check it? (multiple choice, 2 correct answers) 
  
42.5% 33.3% 49% 50% 0% 
50% 66.7% 50.9% 100% 58.3% 
 
Table 4. Results of statistical analysis of the results obtained from the questionnaire (rotated 
component matrix) 
 
 
 Mean SD SE Pr>F t F p 
C
o
rre
latio
n
 
R2 
PART 1 Electronic system usage at a healthcare site                
1 Did you have cyber security training at work? 43.60 60.12 .151 6.37 0.008 40.59 .008 .965 .931 
2 
Do electronic systems at your healthcare site facilitate 
your work? 
12.00 9.434 .485 1.12 0.346 1.25 .346 .542 .294 
3 
Do you think that the electronic circulation of documents 
at your healthcare site is adequately protected? 
28.00 45.89 .238 3.83 0.031 14.64 .031 .911 .830 
4 
Do you use a mobile device (smartphone or tablet) to read 
electronic medical records? 
8.00 12.57 .179 5.97 0.017 40.07 .017 .945 .894 
5 
Can you copy medical records to a non-secured portable 
storage? 
8.00 9.08 .329 2.49 0,09 6.22 .088 .821 .675 
Page 3876
  
 
The next step in the research was a factor 
analysis; the 300 (48,39%) respondents who 
completed the questionnaire in hospitals in Poland 
are presented in Table 4. Each group was assigned 
several questions (Parts I and II), and a cyberattack 
scenario (Part III) was also applied. When the set of 
questions was divided into smaller parts, they pointed 
to stimulating factors. It should be noted that the 
table presents factors with the highest test variable 
and determination coefficient for each of the 
questions asked in the particular professional groups. 
The zero hypothesis that the level of knowledge 
on cyber security with regard to medical care is high 
within all occupational groups might be rejected (p< 
0.05) in accordance to the variability of the test (F-
Snedecor). In the statistics on the probability 
distributions (F-Snedecor), if the values are less than 
p<.05, then the zero hypothesis is rejected, namely, 
there are significant differences. Table 4 shows that 
there was a significant difference in the distribution 
of Part I for questions 1, 3, 4, and 6. In Part II, we did 
not reject the hypothesis in only questions 1 and 8. In 
Part III, a significant difference in distribution 
occurred in questions 2 and 3, where we rejected the 
null hypothesis. Additionally, the determination 
coefficient, R2, which is a measure of the quality of a 
model fit [0,1], was calculated. Table 4 shows a 
matching factor model, where the result is closer to 1, 
and is a good fit. It should be noted that there is a 
poor fit in questions 2 and 7 of Part I. In Parts II and 
III, the factor model is a good fit with a value of close 
to 1. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In the course of the analysis, a comprehensive, 
effective, and fast method for verification cyber 
security awareness in institutions in Poland was 
introduced and successfully applied to 630 
respondents. Less than half (48.39%) of all 
respondents answered all of the questions, however. 
Moreover, the analysis showed how important 
information security is and how to make medical 
professionals aware of the existence of cyberattacks. 
In addition, it should be emphasised that, in the case 
of basic security measures, respondents have a high 
level of knowledge, although this difference does not 
6 
The program used for creating and processing electronic 
medical records does not allow to grant physicians rights 
to…: 
28.00 34.48 .221 10.27 0,15 28.96 .038 .513 0.838 
7 
When making an incorrect entry in the electronic medical 
records system, the entry…: 
8.00 7.11 .473 1.208 0.34 1.58 .335 .556 .322 
8 
Does the electronic medical records system allow you to…: 
(4 answers) 
48.00 54.61 .299 4.97 0.32 45.53 .322 .619 .607 
PART 2 Cyber security knowledge and skills       
1 
Do you know the legal consequences related to the public 
disclosure of patient's medical data? 
56.00 76.42 .339 2.387 .097 5.69 .097 .809 .655 
2 Can you securely send patient medical records by email? 28.00 40.74 .058 17.15 .000 294.08 .000 .995 .990 
3 
Are you aware of the existence of simple online tools that 
allow you to impersonate any email address?  
24.00 42.83 .156 6.186 .009 38.26 .009 .963 .927 
4 Can you electronically sign documents? 20.00 34.64 .090 10.94 .002 119.75 .002 .988 .976 
5 
Do you issue medical certificates in the form of digitally 
signed documents?  
20.00 23.18 .107 9.21 .003 84.73 .003 .983 .966 
6 
What conditions must exist to consider e-documents 
secure? 
40.00 51.98 .148 6.71 .008 46.33 .008 .965 .932 
7 
Does a.pdf file containing the scan of a printed and signed 
document have more legal value than a.pdf document 
without an electronic signature (in Poland)? 
32.00 33.98 .124 7.89 .004 62.39 .004 .977 .954 
8 Is the software on your computer continuously updated? 26.00 38.4 .431 1.79 .375 5.61 .375 .549 .380 
PART 3 Basic cyberattack scenarios:      
1 
 If you find a pen drive in a cafe, will you connect it to your 
computer at work? 
12.00 11.83 .426 1.69 .399 4.61 .399 .536 .397 
2 
You received an email in your work inbox with information 
from the system administrator asking you to click a link, 
log in, and confirm your password to deal with 
administrative tasks in the system. What will you do?  
15.00 20.52 2.303 8.27 .137 120.97 .022 .941 .889 
3 
You receive medical documentation (in the form of a.pdf 
file) as an email attachment regarding a patient from 
another specialist. Can you trust that the documentation 
received is authentic? How can you check it?  
29.00 33.38 .20 8.13 .008 73.93 .008 .968 .937 
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reach a statistical significance when procedures 
related to securing medical records are consistently 
applied.  
The results show that average percentage of 
correct answers is within the range of 36–50% 
depending on the group, which is significantly less 
than expected from a group of trained respondents. 
Additionally, Part III contained multiple-choice 
questions that were simple use cases reflecting the 
starting point of different cyberattacks. The average 
score was around 10% worse in Part III than in Part 
II. This shows that, even when the respondents have 
knowledge, using such knowledge in real world 
scenarios is much more difficult. There is also a 
significant difference in the results between the 
different groups of medical professionals. The 
medical administration staff group achieved the 
lowest average score, the reason for which probably 
results from the different ways the groups have been 
trained in the area of cyber security. 
The overall results are rather unsatisfying, and 
they show that there is much to be done in terms of 
security training and that there is high potential risk 
of cyberattacks exploiting medical professionals 
instead of technical security measures. There have 
been few studies focusing on measuring how secure 
an eHealth system is in reality. The results of our 
survey are similar to those of the security levels 
found in Swiss hospitals [21]. Such results were 
measured from another perspective, i.e. by verifying 
how hospitals comply with the ISO/IEC 27002 
standard; however, the results also indicate that the 
audited hospitals have a low level of security. 
Another recently published work by Jalali and Kaiser 
[19], who studied cyber security in hospitals using a 
series of interviews, shows that one of the reasons is 
the end point complexity of the systems applied. This 
might be the case in Poland where numerous 
different applications are used, making it more 
difficult to create training programs for medical 
professionals that will cover all possible scenarios.  
An analysis of the results in the context of the 
digitisation process in the healthcare field in Poland 
leads to the following conclusions: 
1. A lack of standardised applications and the 
distributed nature of medical records, with only a few 
central government applications, make it difficult to 
design short comprehensive cyber security training 
for all workers. 
2. Many healthcare sites use out-dated 
software with implemented security measures that are 
currently not recommended, or use software that was 
designed for local application without proper security 
measures, and thus the users must be better trained.  
3. Many medical professionals (particularly 
older ones) have a problem with using a computer. 
This is a common problem in Poland. This situation, 
in which they are largely computer illiterate, has 
made it more difficult to teach people about cyber 
security. 
Cyber security training should be improved and 
applied more frequently; moreover, cyber security 
should be taught at the university level. Apart from 
standard recommendations that IT systems should be 
simple, easy to use, and configured in the way to 
minimise the possibility of user errors, healthcare 
organisation can improve cybersecurity awareness by 
improving the trainings by: 
• including simple hands-on laboratories; 
• including real time demonstrations of past 
cyberattacks carried out by cybersecurity 
professionals; 
• including role playing activities that 
demonstrate persuasion techniques used by 
cyber criminals; 
• establishing periodic (e.g., once a years) 
mandatory refreshing e-learning courses. 
The cyber security awareness campaigns in 
general must take into consideration the factors that 
influence human behaviour [33]. Among others, 
trainings’ solutions should be aligned with risks and 
designed to change people behaviour by providing 
simple consistent rules of behaviour that are easy to 
follow [34]. The Bada et al. [34] provide a good 
analysis of these factors and analyse a few general 
cyber security awareness campaigns. Moreover, the 
use of the various teaching methods allows people to 
better understand a given topic [35]. 
In comparison to the general public awareness 
campaigns, the healthcare professionals are subject to 
a greater number of risks. The consequences of 
unauthorized disclosure of medical documentation 
are serious. In European Union, GDPR strictly 
describes responsibilities of persons processing 
medical data. In Poland, unauthorised disclosure of 
medical data might result in a penalty, deprivation of 
liberty, imprisonment for up to 2 years or suspension 
of the professional licence. Additionally, the patient 
will be able to claim compensation before a court. 
Another result of the present study shows, above 
all, the lack of appropriate tools for a fast and 
inexpensive assessment regarding cyber security 
awareness in a large number of hospitals. These 
results indicate that one can quickly and safely check 
the awareness of individuals regarding the risks 
associated with cyberattacks. The main difficulty is 
to find a large number of respondents. Such surveys 
are perceived by many persons from management as 
a part of a cyberattack itself (which is the correct 
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attitude toward surveys in which the source is 
unknown). Therefore, some type of official 
authorisation of the survey is required, which slows 
down the process.  
Frequent audits of user cyber security awareness 
will become increasingly important because large 
numbers of hospitals need to address information 
security issues in their healthcare systems. The 
security of information processing in hospitals, such 
prevention the manipulation (deliberate or 
intentional) of data, is critical to a patient’s health. In 
addition, patient health data are protected by law, and 
all data must be stored, transferred, and processed in 
a secure manner ensuring confidentiality and 
integrity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper presented the results from a survey 
measuring cyber security awareness. The results 
show a rather low level of knowledge regarding 
information security. This might be caused by the 
fact that many aspects of cyber security are difficult 
to learn during a few days of training. In addition, 
several cyber security threats are abstract for people 
without in-depth computer knowledge. Hence, they 
sometimes have difficulties in understanding the 
consequences of the threats, and therefore 
underestimate how much negatively they can 
influence the healthcare process. Effective teaching 
of new skills can lead to the prevention of risky 
behaviours in the selected environment, as lack of 
motivation is sometimes a real lack of skills [36].  
This study indicates an urgent need to take action 
and improve the security of information in hospitals 
by raising the awareness of healthcare professionals 
regarding cyber threats. This should be done mainly 
by improving the quality of cyber security training 
among medical professionals and increasing their 
frequency. 
Future work will include building an IT system 
allowing surveys to be conducted, which will give 
respondents a guarantee that the results remain 
anonymous (in the present survey we did not collect 
any data on the responders, which was guaranteed 
based on our declaration). We suspect that such a 
system might result in a higher ratio of respondents 
who complete the survey. In addition, we are 
planning to create a larger pool of questions that can 
be used interchangeably, and thus we will become 
more confident that the medical professionals do not 
obtain answers from their colleagues. The main 
reason for developing such a system is that, without a 
proper tool to measure cyber security awareness, it 
will be difficult to monitor how such awareness 
changes. 
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